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THE GENERAL DUTY OF GOOD FAITH-ITS

RECOGNITION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION
Robert S Summers t

INTRODUCTION

The text of section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1979 and published in final
form in 1981, provides:
§205. Duty of GoodFaith and FairDealing Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and its enforcement.'
This section, together with its accompanying Comment and Reporter's
Note, recognizes and conceptualizes a general duty of good faith and
fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of contracts in American law.2 In addition, a number of other sections and Comments partic3
ularize the bearing of this general duty in various ways.
The first Restatement of Contracts, which appeared in 1932, did
not include a section comparable to section 205. 4 This new section reflects one of the truly major advances in American contract law during
the past fifty years.
The late Robert Braucher, then Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School, was the Reporter for the Restatement Second during the years
when section 205 was in embryo, and he drafted it. Professor Braucher
acknowledged that an article I wrote on the subject published in 1968
substantially influenced the recognition and conceptualization of good
faith in section 205. 5 It is therefore probably not inappropriate for me
t
McRoberts Research Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Visiting Research Fellow, Merton College, Oxford University 1981-1982. B.S. 1955, University of Oregon; LL.B.
1959, Harvard University. I wish to record my indebtedness to Professor John Farrar of
University College, Cardiff, and Mr. Peter Hacker, Fellow of St. Johns College, Oxford University, for valuable discussion. I also wish to thank Mr. Brent G. Summers, Class of 1982,
University of Oregon School of Law, and Mr. Alan M. Anderson, Class of 1982, Cornell Law
School, for various forms of assistance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
I
2 See Appendix (containing text of § 205, its Comment, and accompanying Reporter's
Note).
3 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 34, 74, 157, 172, 176, 188, 228,
241, 248, 251, 257, 259, 264, 265, 277 (1979).
4
See generalo RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).
5 See note 25 and accompanying text infia. The article is Summers, "Cood Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195
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to offer some remarks on the occasion of its final official publication. I
hasten to say, however, that I now have relatively little to add to my
6
earlier, somewhat extended study, with perhaps two exceptions.
The questions I will consider briefly here are these: What was the
basis upon which the general duty in section 205 was recognized? How
did the draftsman conceptualize good faith in section 205, and how
might one respond to the various criticisms that have been made of this
type of conceptualization? And is there anything of general value that
draftsmen, judges, and others might learn about conceptualization for
the law's purposes from our legal experience thus far with efforts to conceptualize good faith? In addressing these questions, I will not set forth
and discuss the now vast body of judge-made and statutory law in the
background. A large number of articles, including my own earlier one,
7
treat this law at length.
Section 205 represents a major advance for several reasons. First,
the sheer volume of case law and statutory development it reflects is
vast. Second, the section symbolizes a commitment to the most fundamental objectives a legal system can have-justice, and justice according
to law.8 Thus, it is of a piece with explicit requirements of "contractual
morality" such as the unconscionability doctrine 9 and various general
equitable principles.' 0 The increasing recognition of such requirements
is one of the hallmarks of the law of our time. Third, although the general duty of good faith and fair dealing is no more than a minimal requirement (rather than a high ideal), its relevance in contractual
matters is peculiarly wide-ranging, and it rules out many varieties of
bad faith in a diverse array of contexts. Fourth, section 205 embodies a
general requirement that has a distinctively significant role to play in
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Good Faith]. At the December 1967 meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, I had two lengthy discussions with Professor Braucher about good
faith in general contract law and the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. I
might also add the following for those beginning law professors who might be moved to address their writings solely to judges. In the late 1960s a well known commercial law scholar at
the University of Michigan remarked to me that the foregoing article would have little or no
effect on further developments in our law because it was conceptually "too difficult for most
judges to follow."
6 The exceptions have to do with some further thoughts I now have on the art of conceptualization for legal purposes, and on the bearing of the rule of law and associated values
here. See Parts II A and II D infra.
7 See Burton, GoodFaith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 67 IoWA L. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Article 2 Good Faith]; Burton, Breach of
Contractand the Common Law Duty to Perform in GoodFaith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Breach of Contract]; Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 203, 216-52 (citing
cases).
8 Summers, Good Faith,supra note 5, at 198.
9 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ch. 4 (2d ed. 1980).
10 See generally Summers, GeneralEquitable Pinciples Under Section 1-103 of the Un'form Commercial Code, 72 NW. L. REv. 906 (1978).
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the law. It is a kind of "safety valve" to which judges may turn to fill
gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules
of law and specific contract language. 1 Finally, as an explicit general
requirement, it has all the advantages of a direct and overt tool rather
than an indirect and covert one.1 2 In the long history of contract, judges
who have not had such a tool ready to hand have either had to leave
bad faith unredressed or resort to indirect and covert means, 13 thereby
fictionalizing the law or otherwise begetting unclarity, unpredictability,
or inequity. 14
Of course, Restatement recognition of a general duty of good faith
is important in its own way. 15 The American Law Institute is a group of
distinguished professors, judges, and practitioners. It is the only body
that undertakes to single out developments ripe for recognition as generally authoritative. Judges usually accord its various "Restatements"
considerable respect, and some courts regard these formulations as "the
law."16
I
RECOGNITION

The general requirement of good faith recognized in section 205 is
based on numerous judicial opinions imposing a duty of good faith, several major statutory developments, and the published writings of professors of law. By the late 1960s, when section 205 (then numbered section
231) was being drafted, the accumulation of case law imposing a duty of
contractual good faith outside contexts of "good-faith purchase" was
considerable. In particular, the courts of two leading states, New York
and California, had by then rendered many decisions affording relief for
various forms of bad faith in contractual relations; the corpus of decisions from other jurisdictions was sizeable too.17 Moreover, no American
case had been found in which the court said that "good faith is not
required in the performance of a contract or in enforcement of a contract."' 8 In my 1968 article, I sought to provide a survey and catalogue
of many of the relevant cases. Thus there were many decisions in which
judges had recognized and ruled out a number of general types of bad
''

12
13

See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 779-80 (1969).
See general.y Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1959).
For numerous examples of such resort, see Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial

GoodFaith: GoodFaith Disclosure in ContractFormation, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 381, 388-89 (1978);
Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 231.
14 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 198-99.
15
See general.y Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Diftulties, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 140 (1981).
16 Courts in many states have often cited the Restatements as more or less direct authority. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENTS IN THE COURTS.
17 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 216-52.
18 47 ALI PROCE.DINGS 490 (1970).
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faith in performance, including: evasion of the spirit of the deal; lack of
diligence and slacking off; wilful rendering of only substantial performance; abuse of a power to determine compliance; and interference with,
or failure to cooperate in, the other party's performance. In such cases,
the courts went beyond the more familiar standards of performancefor example, the specific terms of agreements, general gap-filler law,
course of dealing, and custom and usage-and invoked a general requirement of good faith. Many courts proceeded similarly in coping
with various forms of bad faith in the assertion, settlement, and litigation of contract claims and defenses. Among other things, they ruled out
bad faith in the form of: conjuring up a pretended dispute in order, for
example, to lay a basis for a settlement; asserting an overreaching or
"weaseling" interpretation or construction of contract language; taking
advantage of another's necessitous circumstances to secure a favorable
modification; making harassing demands for assurances of performance;
wrongfully refusing to accept performance; wilfully failing to mitigate
damages; and abusing a power to determine compliance or to terminate
a contract. In section 205 of the Restatement Second, and in the accompanying Comment and Reporter's Note, Professor Braucher adopted
nearly all of the foregoing categories, and most of the Illustrations in the
Comment are based on cases decided before 1970 that fall into these
categories. 19

The Restatement Second "authority" for section 205 was not, however,
confined to general contract case law. The authority for the section 205
requirement-as distinguished from the conceptualization of good faith
that it incorporates-also included statutory law, particularly provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code.20 By the late 1960s, this new uniform act had been adopted in a majority of states. Many of its sections
and Comments imposed specific duties of good faith. Moreover, one of
its most famous provisions is section 1-203, which states that "[e]very
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement."'2 1 This general obligation was, in the
1950s, a major innovation in American statutory law, and is the closest
ancestral authority for the Restatement Second's section 205. It is hardly
surprising, then, that the first Comment to section 205 opens with references to Uniform Commercial Code provisions on good faith. 22 The
next section of this Article, dealing with the conceptualization of good
faith in the Restatement Second suggests, however, that the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement Second diverge significantly.
19 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comments d-e, Reporter's
Note (1979) with Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 232-52.
20 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 195, 207-16.
21

U.C.C. § 1-203.

22

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205, Comment a (1979).
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The general "legislative" history of section 205 is not extensive.
Prior to 1981, two versions had appeared, one in 197023 and one in
1973,24 and both were numbered "section 231." There were no significant differences between the two versions. The 1970 version was
presented formally at the May 1970 meeting of the American Law Institute in Washington, D. C., and it was then tentatively adopted. The
transcript of the 1970 Proceedings of the American Law Institute includes the following:
PROFESSOR BRAUCHER:
Well, I could, then, go to Topic 2, which has some somewhat
more novel provisions in it. You could use a different heading, but I
don't know that it would be much more informative.
This is matters which are related to interpretation, but are not
strictly the meaning of the parties. They are considerations brought
in, and I think fairness and the public interest is a pretty fair description of them; and Section 231 is entirely new to the Restatement, although it is not new to the law.
Now, I have been asked about Section 231: Is this really a restatement of the law? Isn't this an attempt, you know, to write the
Sermon on the Mount into the Restatement of Contracts?
And the answer is: I think there is a good deal ofjudicial authority for the proposition. The precise formulation of it is taken out of
the Uniform Commercial Code, but I think in the history of that in
the Commercial Code it was not thought of as a novel proposition in
the law.
I should call attention to a limitation on this. The black letter is
limited, as is the section of the Commercial Code, to good faith in
performance and enforcement, and is not a requirement, as stated
here, of good faith in bargaining, good faith in offer and acceptance.
Now, there are some obligations of good faith and fair dealing in
the making of a contract, as distinguished from performance and enforcement. I don't think you can find a case in the whole history of
the common law in which a court says that good faith is not required
in the performance of a contract or in enforcement of a contract.
Now, the trouble with this section, of course, is that it's very general, very abstract, and it needs specification the worst way, and specification is not to be had. I am indebted for its formulation here in the
comments-formulations in the comments-to Professor Summers in
a piece cited on page 100. He made considerable effort and collected
this very large number of cases in which judicial opinions had insisted
on some obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the performance
and enforcement of contracts. And then he tried to categorize them,
and I have borrowed heavily from his classification scheme in giving a
little more detail about this.
23
24

Id. § 231 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
Id. § 231 (Revised and Edited ed., Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
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But I don't want to try to disguise what's being said here. This
proposition is thoroughly acceptable if you define good faith very narrowly; but as you define good faith more broadly, doubts begin to
arise, and I put in the Reporter's Note on page 100 a reference to
what happened to the law of Germany under the heading of--of
course, in German-good faith. It became, in the days of the great
inflation following World War One a license for judicial remaking of
contracts way beyond anything that ever happened in the United
States.
Now, I suppose if we got to a place where you had 25 per cent
inflation every month that you might find some judicial activism here
too. Hopefully, we don't have to face that problem.
Anyway, the principle is to be found in judicial opinions. I haven't invented it. It's also to be found in the Commercial Code. I
think there are more judicial opinions along this line in the New York
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of California than there are
in most of the other courts, but I have been told that some lovely
illustrations of this can be found in the decisions of the Court of
Claims, and I have requested additional enlightenment on that, because I'm not as familiar with those decisions, perhaps, as I should be.
Anyway, there it is. [There was no comment]
25
I'm amazed ....
The final version of the general Restatement obligation of good
faith, renumbered in section 205 with Comment, was officially published in 1981 and included only minor changes. 26 Perhaps most noteworthy are the new references in the Reporter's Note to further
supporting court decisions rendered after the late 1960s, when section
205 was first formulated. Thirteen such cases are cited, and these by no
means represent all or even necessarily the most important such decisions on contractual good faith rendered between the late 1960s and
198 1.27
From time to time in the history of the American Law Institute's
various "Restatement" ventures, a particular Restatement section has
been challenged on the ground that it lacked legitimacy. Usually the
challenge has taken the form of a claim that the section at hand was
based on nonexistent case law, was contrary to the case law, or went
beyond case law in some way. It should by now be evident that no such

25

47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 489-91 (1970).

Besides the addition of case authority in the 1981 final version, one should note that:
(1) in the 1973 version, a clause at the end of the first sentence of Comment c, "but bad faith
in negotiation is also subject to sanctions," was dropped from the 1970 version; (2) the concluding sentence of Illustration 4 of the 1970 version was reformulated in the 1973 version;
and (3) in the 1981 version, Illustration 6 was dropped from the 1973 draft.
27 For a useful collection of additional cases dealing with good-faith performance, see
26

Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 7; Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7.
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claim can be asserted plausibly with respect to section 205. It enjoys
full-fledged Restatement legitimacy.
II
CONCEPTUALIZATION

I will begin with some preliminary remarks on the general problem
28
I
of conceptualization as it arises for draftsmen and others in the law.

will then describe the "excluder" conceptualization of good faith in section 205 and the Comment, explain its origins, and contrast it with the
conceptualization of good faith in the Uniform Commercial Code. I
will also consider the extent to which section 205 is consistent with the

"rule of law" and values associated with that ideal.
A.

The General Problem of Conceptualiation

As the term is used here, a "conceptualization" is an intellectual
construct that represents or embodies an idea formulated in words for
some general or special purpose or purposes.2 9 When a draftsman is
formulating a legal requirement, he may be called upon to conceptualize some idea, or ideas, to appear in the explicit language of the requirement itself or in an accompanying official Comment or other
authoritative legislative history. The purpose, or purposes, of the legal
requirement involved-and thus of the conceptualization-may be to
fulfill one or more general norms of right behavior (such as the fulfillment of just expectations) or to serve some general or particular social
goal (such as safety, or the facilitation of personal economic pursuits).30
The legal requirement involved may be in the nature of a very general
principle or maxim, or it may take the form of a specific detailed rule.
The idea (or ideas) may be, as in the case of good faith, one that is
already familiar from some moral or legal context or realm of discourse,
or the idea may be one that is (or is to be) entirely or very largely the
law's own creation, such as "demurrer" or "tax deduction." The idea
may be one that is to figure directly in the characterization of ordinary
human action or inaction, such as "acting in good faith." Or it may be
one that is only indirectly or remotely related to ordinary daily human
action, such as "jurisdiction" or "future interest." If the idea has to do
with human action, the action involved may be of a kind that is highly
28 In my earlier article, I failed to distinguish clearly between this problem as it arises for
those who are seeking to interpret and apply case law or written law, and the problem as it
arises for draftsmen. This was a serious failure. In the case of what I will call "excluder"
conceptualizations (see text accompanying note 29 infta), however, it turns out that they may
serve both as useful approaches to interpretation and as models for the draftsman.
29
I do not intend this to be a formal definition.
30 On this basic distinction (really a set of differences), see Summers, Two Tpes ofSubstantive Reasons: The Core of a Theog of Common-Law Jusfz~ation, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 707
(1978).
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diverse, such as "contracting behavior," or it may be of a kind that is
relatively invariant and discrete, such as "filing a tax return." And if
the idea has to do with human action, it may relate to some mental
element in that action, or it may not.
The foregoing and still other variations affect the problem of conceptualization that the draftsman faces. One further variation merits
extended emphasis here. The idea or ideas to be conceptualized for purposes of the legal requirement may yield felicitously to one method of
conceptualization (or perhaps more) but not to others. This is particularly so of certain ideas already known to us from prior social or legal
experience. When such an idea has a special integrity of its own, 3 ' the
draftsman will not be entirely free to treat it merely as he wishes, even
for the law's own special purposes. If he does so, he will at the very least
risk confusing those to whom the law is addressed. He will also risk the
possibility that the conceptualization he adopts will otherwise fail to
serve the legal purposes he has in mind. This does not mean that in
formulating his conceptualization the draftsman can never inventively
reconstruct the idea to serve better the law's purposes. It does mean that
whatever the extent of any reconstruction, the conceptualization must
still remain sufficiently faithful to the idea or ideas involved. 3 2 As we
will see, the draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code's provisions on
good faith (himself a brilliant professor of law) did not sufficiently grasp
this general truth.
With regard to such ideas, it is important for the draftsman to try
to get them "straight" in the first place before undertaking any formulation of them for the law's purposes, let alone any possible reconstructive
conceptualization of them. He will be best equipped to do this if he has
some understanding of various general methods of conceptualization
and of how a given idea may yield to one method (or perhaps more) but
not to others. This is not the place for an extended essay on the different
methods of conceptualization that a draftsman might employ; it will be
enough for now merely to provide a highly abbreviated, yet suggestive,
listing of several such methods:
1. Conceptualization by formal definition-e.g., resort to necessary
and sufficient conditions for the use of a word or phrase.
31

"Integrity" may not be the best word here. That many ideas have such integrity (or

the like) is seldom denied in the case of scientific and technological ideas that may have to be
incorporated into the law in some way. Yet many people are skeptical when it comes to nonscientific and non-technological ideas. In my view, such a priori skepticism is unfounded.
Thus, lawyers should be wary of the "Humpty Dumpty" syndrome: "When I use a word, it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE ch. 6 (1871).
32 What counts as "sufficiently faithful" is problem-specific and cannot be usefully formulated in the abstract, or specified in advance.
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2. Conceptualization by synonymous paraphrase of the word or
phrase in question (including contrastive paraphrase).
3. Conceptualization by paradigmatic sample, specifying what is required for the use of the word or phrase.
4. Conceptualization mainly by recital or representative examples illustrating the application of the word or phrase.
5. Conceptualization by specification of family resemblances that run
through diverse uses of the word or phrase.
6. Conceptualization by way of "excluder analysis."
This is not an exhaustive list. The use of each of the above methods
for legal purposes could be the subject of a separate essay. 33 For now, I
only wish to stress that there are various methods of conceptualization
on which legal draftsmen may draw; and that although some ideas may
be fruitfully conceptualized in more than one way, certain others may
(for the law's purposes) yield felicitously to only one method, and that
draftsmen would do well to heed these truths. Otherwise, they may improperly conceptualize the ideas involved. This will very likely frustrate
the law's purposes, either through the confusion it may breed, or
through any resulting maladjustment of means to ends. The adequacy
of a conceptualization may be judged by three related criteria: (1)
whether it is sufficiently faithful to the idea involved; (2) whether it
serves sufficiently the purposes of the legal requirement being formulated; and (3) whether it serves the more general legal purposes associated with the expression "the rule of law."
B.

"Excluder" Conceptualizations

Some ideas yield to this mode of conceptualization, and it has been
my view since the mid-1960s that this is true of the idea of good faith. I
will not here repeat the extended excluder analysis of good faith that I
set forth in my 1968 article.3 4 I will merely summarize its essence. In
my view, some words and phrases do not have a general positive meaning of their own within the contexts or realms of discourse in which they
are at home. Instead, these words or phrases function to rule out various

things according to context. The notion that some ideas are of this character was not my invention and is hardly novel. The excluder conceptualization may have appeared first in Aristotle's writings. 35 The late
33 It would be well if we had such an essay or essays addressed specifically to the legal
draftsman. Most of the relevant writing is by philosophers and is done for non-legal purposes.
See, e.g., R. ROBINSON, DEFINITION (1950); L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans. 1958); Hall, Excluders, 20 ANALYSIS 1 (1959); Hart, The Ascnrition
of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 171, 181 (1949)
("defeasible" concepts); McGuinness & Matthews, Meaning and Contrast, 43 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (Supp. Vol. 85, 1969).

34
35

See Summers, GoodFaith,supra note 5, at 199-207.
3 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHAEN ETHICS (W. Ross trans. 1925).
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Professor J. L. Austin of Oxford University made much of it. His discussion of the term "real" is illuminating:
That is, a definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is
real, a real such-and-such, only in the light of a specific way in which
it might be, or might have been, not real. "A real duck" differs from
the simple "a duck" only in that it is used to exclude various ways of
being not a real duck-but a dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, &c.;
and moreover I don't knowjst how to take the assertion that it's a
real duck unless I know just what, on that particular occasion, the
speaker has it in mind to exclude. This, of course, is why the attempt
to find a characteristic common to all things that are or could be
called "real" is doomed to failure; the function of "real" is not to contribute positively to the characterization of anything, but to exclude
possible ways of being not real-and these ways are both numerous for
particular kinds of things, and liable to be quite different for things of
different kinds. It is this identity of general function combined with
immense diversity in specific applications which gives to the word
"real" the, at first sight, baffling feature of having neither one single
"meaning", nor yet ambiguity, a number of different meanings. 36
In addition to the word "real," itself not really a word much used in
the law, one might cite many other notions at work in the law that do
yield best to an excluder analysis. "Voluntary," as it is generally used
not only in moral discourse, but also in the criminal law, is very likely an
excluder. H. L. A. Hart once observed that "the word 'voluntary' in
fact serves to exclude a heterogeneous range of cases such as physical
compulsion, coercion by threats, accidents, mistakes, etc., and not to
designate a mental element or state. . ..
Requirements of equality
in many branches of the law probably yield best to an excluder analysis,
according to which these requirements rule out a heterogeneous variety
of forms of unjustified discrimination. Presumably the same goes for
certain legal requirements of fairness. One scholar has even claimed
38
that the notion of justice itself is best analyzed in these terms.
"37

In my view, good faith in the general requirement of good faith in
ordinary moral dealings, and in the general case law of contract up to
the late 1960s, was most felicitously conceptualized as an "excluder."
That is, it was not appropriately formulable in terms of some general
positive meaning-through the specification of a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions, for example; rather, it functioned as an excluder to
rule out a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. This is not to
say that paraphrase, example, and other methods of conceptualization
36

J. AUSTIN,

SENSE AND SENSIBILIA

70-71 (G. Warnock ed. 1962) (emphasis in

original).
37

Hart, The Asiption of Responsibility and Rights, 49

LIAN SOCIETY 171, 180 (1949).
38
Woozley, Inustice, 7 AM. PHIL. Q. MONO. SER.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTE-

109 (1973).
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cannot also cast still further light on this corner of the law. Nor is it to
deny the distinctively illuminating power of the purposes behind such a
requirement in determining its scope and limits, 39 a topic to which I will
return. Nor, finally, is it to deny that judges should try to articulate
criteria to be used to decide whether particular conduct claimed to be in
bad faith really is so-criteria that must inevitably vary somewhat from
context to context. 40 I will return later to this topic as well.
C.

The Restatement-s Conceptualizationof Good Faith as an "Excluder"

Professor Braucher did not attempt to provide a conceptualization
of any assumed general positive content of the expression "good faith"
as it appears in section 205, nor did he seek to so conceptualize it in the
Comments or Reporter's Note to section 205. Thus, for example, he did
not undertake to define good faith in terms of some assumed general,
invariant, and synonymous meaning such as "honesty in fact in the...
41
transaction," as did the draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Indeed, he provided no general definition of good faith at all.4 2 All this,
of course, is consistent with the excluder analysis.
He did assume, as did I in my 1968 article, that it is possible to
formulate specific positive meanings for particular uses of "good faith,"
by way of contrast with the specific forms of bad faith being ruled out in
the context. These meanings would vary "somewhat with the context. ' ' 43 But he did not then go on to try to generalize from these and set
forth a single, positive, and unified general meaning of good faith as
used in section 205. Rather, he stressed that the section 205 requirement
of good faith "excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving 'bad faith,"' including evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack
of diligence and slacking off, abuse of a power to specify terms, conjuring up a dispute to force a settlement or modification, wilfully failing to
mitigate damages, and so on.44 Many theorists have been tempted to
try to conceptualize all these forms of bad faith, partly in terms of some
necessary or singular "mental element," such as a "bad motive." But
Professor Braucher saw that this would not do either, and stated: "Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance
even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction,
39 I articulated such purposes in my earlier article, Summers, Good Faith,s.upra note 5, at
198-99, but I failed to develop them.
40 I recognized this in the Good Faith piece, supra note 5, at 206, but I should have gone
further.
41 See U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
42 See Appendix.
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comment a (1979).
44 Id. § 205, Comments a, d, e.
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and fair dealing may require more than honesty."'4 5
Professor Braucher did go on to try to articulate the general purposes of the section: that of securing "faithfulness to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party," and compliance with "community standards of decency, fairness
or reasonableness." 46 But this is not the same as specifying a general
positive meaning for the expression as it appears in section 205. This
remains true even if one concedes, as I certainly would, that the section
must be interpreted and applied in light of its purposes. 4 7 Furthermore,
as a corollary of the excluder conceptualization, Professor Braucher
stressed that a "complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible."4 8
In my view, the conceptualization of good faith as an excluder in
section 205, the Comment, and the Reporter's Note satisfies the relevant
criteria of adequacy. It is sufficiently faithful to the nature of the basic
idea involved, and it is aptly designed to serve the general substantive
purposes of the legal requirement involved, including the fulfillment of
just expectations. Also, it is not defined restrictively and therefore can
be deployed in unforeseen circumstances as a kind of safety valve. It
also can sufficiently serve the more general purposes connoted by the
phrase "the rule of law." For now I will only undertake specific discussion of this last point.
D. Consistency of the Restatement Conceptualizationwith the "Rule of Law"
The rule of law does not require that all forms of law consist of
rules.49 Section 205 itself, with its excluder conceptualization, is not a
rule; it is more in the nature of a principle or maxim, and if I am right,
this is as it should be. Section 205 is an unusually "circumstancebound" requirement, and excludes highly varied forms of bad faith,
many of which become identifiable only in the context of circumstantial
50
detail of a kind that defies comprehensive formulation in a single rule.
Those who would insist in the name of the rule of law that all forms of
law must consist of specific detailed rules addressed to narrow patterns
of fact have very likely not thought through the implications of their
position. 5 ' In the field of commercial law alone, this would require subId., Comment d. But see Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7, at 384-87.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comment a.
In my own earlier article, I stated these purposes somewhat differently, but there is
very great overlap between the two statements. Compare id. § 205, Comment a with Summers,
Good Faith, supra note 5, at 198-99.
48
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comment d (1979). See generally
45
46
47

Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 199-207; see also id. at 206.
49 See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 2 (1978); L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969).
50
See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 203, 215-16.
51 Nor have they thought through their motives. I have met lawyers from time to time
who seem to believe that those responsible for the law always owe lawyers an obligation to
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stantial revision, including an overhaul of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Not only would section 1-203 on good faith have to go, but so
would section 1-103 on general equitable principles and section 2-302 on
unconscionability. Many other provisions would at least have to be revised and narrowed.
Although section 205 of the Restatement Second is as it should be, it
does not follow that the numerous and varied contexts to which it is
addressed cannot, in addition, be governed by still other forms of "goodfaith" law. 52 As we have seen, the Restatement Second itself includes several further provisions that, among other things, purport to particularize
the requirement of section 205 in given contexts. Beyond these provisions, one can identify three further (to some extent overlapping) forms
of good-faith law addressed to many of these contexts which are now
either more or less fully formed or in process of development. First, we
now have a vast accumulation of holdings with stated reasons. The generality implicit (and sometimes explicit) in this form of law is often considerable. 53 Second, courts and scholars are now, for some of these
contexts, beginning to formulate lzsts of criteria for identifying specific
forms of bad faith. 54 The generality of such criteria represents a form of
law of long-standing respectability in our legal experience. It was law of
this type that I had in mind when, in my earlier piece, I wrote that: "No
effort has been made here to identify the criteria which judges ought to
use in deciding particular conduct is in bad faith, although enough has
been said to show that these criteria must vary from context to context."' 55 Third, the accumulation of experience with respect to some
contexts might be sufficiently extensive, and the circumstantial attributes of these contexts sufficiently amenable, to permit the formulation of
detailedrules that rule out specific forms of bad faith. I have not tried my
hand at constructing such rules, but I would not be surprised if some
could now be so formulated to go beyond those already recognized in
the Restatement Second sections that are corollaries of section 205.
create and package that law in the form of tiny bits, the scope of which is always totally
certain and easily ascertainable in advance. Why? Because, it is said, lawyers must earn a
livelihood and law of this sort is the kind most saleable to clients!
52 Although I recognized this in my 1968 article, I did not stress it enough.
53
The best theoretical treatment of this legal element is in the field of constitutional
law, but it also applies, mulatis mulandis, to contract and commercial law. See Greenawalt, The
Enduring Significance of Neutral Pincioles, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978).
54 The most detailed example to date is probably Professor Hillman's treatment of bad
faith modifications of contracts. See Hillman, ContractModifcation Under the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 680 (1982); Hillman, Policing ContractModifations Under the
UC. Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849 (1979). For another
example of an effort to articulate specific criteria in still another context, see Holmes, supra
note 13, at 451.
55 Summers, GoodFaith,supra note 5, at 206. If I were to revise this formulation now, I
would insert "somewhat" after "vary," and would go on to set forth the substance of what I
say in this entire subsection of the present Article.
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It may be said that all this presupposes relevant pre-existing law (of
one or more of the foregoing three forms) addressed to the specific context at hand, and that courts, when faced with as yet judicially unaddressed contexts, will be essentially without the guidance required by the
values of predictability and the uniformity demanded by the rule of law.
Indeed, it may be said that if good faith is conceptualized merely as an
excluder, judges will be free simply to call anything they wish "bad
faith." Thus, in such cases the law merely will be whatever the judges
say it is. 5 6 Now this must be seen for what it is-namely, a broadside

attack, however implicit, on section 205 itself, largely in the name of the
rule of law. For in cases of the type envisioned, the judges will at least
have section 205, the Comment, and the Reporter's Note to go on. The
attack is also, one may add, a broadside attack on the judgment of Professor Braucher, his Restatement Second cohorts, and the American Law
Institute. Of course, none of these individuals or groups qualifies for unimpeachable legal sainthood. But their collective wisdom is not something to be taken lightly. And it should be remembered, in particular,
that of all academics associated with contractual and commercial law
reform in his day, Professor Braucher was notoriously one of the most
hard-headed and practically minded. Predictability and uniformity
were high on his list of legal values.
In my view, a judge in a novel case posing an issue of good faith
under section 205 with its excluder conceptualization is far from lacking
meaningful guidance of the kind legitimately to be demanded in the
name of the rule of law. He should start with the language of the section. Second, he should turn to the purposes of section 205 as set forth
mainly in Comment a. These purposive rationales will infuse the excluder analysis with meaning in all the ways that purposive interpretation is known generally to provide guidance to judges (as in the case of
statutes) .57 Third, after completing this, he should seek guidance by the
time-honored common-law method of reasoning by analogy, not only
from past cases, but from the various illustrations set forth in the Comments to section 205. Such reasoning, particularly that which is done
with an eye to the reasons given by prior judges, can provide substantial
insight into how novel cases should be decided. Fourth, also in light of
the purposes of section 205 and any general analogies, he can analyze
the relevant facts-alleged or proven-to see what specific reasons these
facts, and the values they implicate, generate for and against characterizing the action or inaction in question as bad-faith behavior. Fifth, be56 Several commentators have in fact suggested as much. See, e.g., Gillette, Limitations on
the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 650; Holmes, supra note 13, at 401-02.
57 See generally L. FULLER, THE ANATOMY OF LAW 14-18, 38-39, 56-59, 82-86, 95 (1968);
L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); L. FULLER, supra note 49, at 81-91, 22432; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Lawu--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958).
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cause of the very nature of the problem, the excluder analysis is not only
faithful to the reality involved, but it is itself a distinctive source of illumination. It does not focus on some presumed positive and unitary element or cluster of elements called "good faith"; instead, it focuses on
whether the alleged form of bad-faith behavior really is, in the context,
ruled out by section 205, when considered in light of its purposes and in
relation to the facts of the case. 58 The foregoing factors do not exhaust
all the forms of guidance that section 205 provides, but they are more
than sufficient to rebut the charge that a section in which good faith is
conceptualized as an excluder leaves the judges at sea and the "law"
merely whatever the judges say it is.
It may be added that the lengthy German experience with a comparably general requirement of good faith in its contract law has not
been a legally unhappy one. The requirement has not proliferated into
the kind of mere ad hoc judicial caprice that some critics of a section
such as Restatement Second section 205 presumably would have
predicted.5 9
E. Relative Inferiority of the Uniform Commercial Code Conceptualization
As we have seen, the Uniform Commercial Code includes a general
section like Restatement Second section 205. Section 1-203 of the Code provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." In addition,
many sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, and numerous Official
60
Comments, impose particular duties of good faith.
This body of Code law served as one of the authoritative underpinnings of the Restatement Second's section 205. But there ends the Code
influence. 61 Section 205 conceptualizes good faith as an excluder; the
Code's section 1-203 does not do so. 62 The Code section and accompanying definitions generally conceptualize good faith as "honesty in fact."
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth observed in 1963 that this restrictive con58 Moreover, one need not know the "one and only correct interpretation" of a transaction to know when an interpretation is obviously incorrect. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of
Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Ojiers, Directors,and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L.
REv. 375, 422 (1975).
59 See generaly J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF LAw 461-502 (1968). I have not, incidentally, sought to apply the excluder analysis to the German case law, but it seems more than a
little likely that it would apply.
60 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 195, 207-16.
61 It should also be noted that both formulations are restricted to "performance" and
"enforcement"; they do not explicitly extend to the negotiation stage. Some differences in
wording might be noted, too: (1) the Restatement Second includes the words "and fair dealing,"
but the Code provision does not, and (2) the Code provision applies the requirement of good
faith to every "contract or duty within this Act," whereas the Restatement Second applies only to
"every contract."
62 The commentators almost always fail to point out this fundamental difference. See,
e.g., Holmes, supra note 13, at 390.
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ceptualization of good faith "enfeebled" the Code's section 1-203, because many forms of contractual bad faith do not involve dishonesty as
such. 6 3 In my 1968 article I sought to demonstrate the truth of this at
some length.64 The narrowness of the foregoing conceptualization was
only partially mitigated by the fact that the honesty definition was prefaced with the words "unless the context otherwise requires," and that
certain other sections of the Code incorporated a less restrictive definition. 65 Here, then, is a striking example of the failure of a draftsman
(Professor Karl N. Llewellyn) to conceptualize an idea in a manner sufficiently faithful to its own basic character. 66 This underscores the importance of recognizing problems of conceptualization in the law for what
they are-they are not merely formal matters of selecting linguistic
67
expressions.
Professor Braucher understood as much. He recognized that the
Code's general conceptualization of good faith as "honesty in fact" was
too narrow. He stated, in particular, that a "focus on honesty is appropriate to cases of good-faith purchase; it is less so in cases of good-faith
performance." 68 In drafting section 205, he was mindful of the impossibility of devising a definition of a general positive meaning for good
faith that would avoid the twin hazards of colliding with the Scylla of
restrictive specificity and spiraling into the Charybdis of vacuous generality. He eschewed general definitions altogether and instead conceptualized the requirement of good faith in section 205, the Comment, and
the Reporter's Note in terms of excluder analysis. Thus, section 205 of
the Restatement Second is superior in conceptualization to its Uniform
Commercial Code counterpart.
III
SOME REPLIES TO CRITICISMS

The type of general requirement of good faith embodied in section
205, including its excluder conceptualization, has already generated
considerable commentary. 69 Most of the commentators agree that some
63 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial ReasonablenessUnder the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CH. L. REv. 666, 673-74 (1963). The same may be said of the restrictive
definitions that, alas, appear in the Model Consumer Credit Act § 1.201 (1973) and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 1.110 (1974).
64 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5,at 210-12.
65 Id. at 212-14.
66 There were, in my view, several different explanations for this. See id. at 215.
67 Many persons in and out of the law frequently appear to assume that what I here call
the task of conceptualization is a mere matter of "expression."
68

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comment b (1979).

69 See, e.g., Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7; Eisenberg, GoodFaith Under the Unfonn
Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1971); Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619; Holmes, supra note 13; Stankiewicz,
Good Faith Obligation in the Unfrm Commercial Code: Problems in Determining Its Meaning and
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such requirement is desirable, but many offer criticisms and suggestions
for improvement. Because I believe that section 205 is on the whole an
admirable piece of work, I will here address and respond to a number of
criticisms directed, implicitly or explicitly, to that section. I will devote
a number of my remarks to the writings of Professor Steven Burton, who
has recently published two articles 70 that should, if any can, arouse me
from my dogmatic slumbers.
A.

The Rationalesfor a Good-Faith Requirement

The rationales for a general requirement of good faith, such as
those appearing in section 205, are of fundamental significance. They
provide judges with indispensable guidance and may even serve as a
kind of unifying "theory" that, if anything can, ties various decisions
together. In my view, there are two primary rationales for such a section: it is a means to "justice and to justice according to law."' 7 1 Professor Braucher did not adopt this specific formulation, but the overlap
between the language he used and my own formulation is great. In his
view, the good-faith requirement serves: (1) "faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party," and (2) "community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." 72 In the general case law, judges have frequently recog73
nized that these rationales are significantly moral.
Some commentators seem to deny that the foregoing justice-oriented rationales really are the true rationales of general good-faith requirements, and/or that they are significantly moral. 74 Yet rationales
such as the foregoing are the ones most commonly stated in the case law.
Moreover, Professor Braucher's language, quoted above, is the exact
language of Comment a of section 205.
It is not uncommon today to find a theorist claiming that the most
"appropriate" rationale for a provision such as section 205 is economic,
at least in its application to good faith performance.75 The requirement is
said to enhance economic efficiency by reducing the costs of contracting,
including "the costs of gathering information with which to choose one's
contract partners, negotiating and drafting contracts, and risk taking
Evaluatihg Its Efect, 7 VAL. U.L. REv.389 (1973). Of course, I do not mean to imply that all
the commentators make precisely the same criticisms or are all skeptical in identical ways.
70 Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7; Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 7.
71 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 198.
72

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comment a (1979).

73 See, e.g., Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967). This is not to say
that § 205 is identical to its moral counterpart. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 204
n.46.
74 Professor Burton does not mention justice; there is something of a tradition in American scholarship to seek to keep the law "pure of moral notions." See Holmes, supra note 13, at
385-87.
75 See, e.g., Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7, at 392-94.
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with respect to the future. ' 76 The general requirement of good faith
accomplishes all this by "allowing parties to rely on the law in place of
incurring some of these costs." ' 77 The "economically rational person"
will thus "substitut[e] good faith at the margin." 78 This claimed economic rationale requires several responses. First, it is ahistoric. As already indicated, the historical evidence favors other rationales. Second,
these other rationales, at least so far as good-faith performance is concerned, are largely moral and include the principle pacta sunt servanda
("the obligation to keep agreements"). 79 To say that this principle is
part of the rationale for a section such as 205 is hardly to render that
section "superfluous." 8 0 It is one function of the good-faith performance
doctrine to enforce the spirit of deals, including their unspecified inner
logic. Indeed, it has even been said that "it is the potential for a lack of
clarity and completeness that necessitates the implication of the good
faith covenant in every contract." 8 1 Third, it is in any case rather speculative that the rationale is economic--even in regard to a duty of goodfaith performance. We really do not know whether general recognition
of this duty is economically efficient. Many more types of costs would
first have to be counted, including the allocable costs of running a legal
system that administers such a doctrine. It might turn out only that the
doctrine is not economically inefficient--or not obviously so-and this
would be a slender reed, indeed, on which to rest section 205. Fourth, it
is one function of rationales to generate, in light of the facts and law,
specific reasons for the decisions of particular cases. The extent to which
an economic rationale such as the one proferred can do this efficiently
and otherwise satisfactorily is, as yet, undemonstrated and problematic,
a matter that Mr. Kelley and I have sought to treat at length
82
elsewhere.
The Possibility That the "Excluder Analysis" Itself Has Been Ultimatey
Discredited

B.

As we have seen, good faith is conceptualized in section 205 as an
excluder-having no general, positive, content of its own-which functions to rule out a wide variety of forms of bad faith. So far as I can
determine, this analysis was first articulated by philosophers, including
Aristotle and J. L. Austin. 83 One commentator has remarked that at
76

Id. at 393.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 7, at 4.

80
81

Id.
Burton, Breach ofContract, supra note 7, at 380 n.44.

82

Summers & Kelley, Economists'Reasonsfor Common Law Dedsiont-A Preliminay Inquig,

I OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (1981).
83 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 201-02.
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least two "lawyer-philosophers" have now "rejected" this method "for
legal purposes."'8 4 The two referred to are Mr. G. P. Baker, Fellow of St.
Johns College, Oxford University, and Professor Michael S. Moore of
the University of Southern California.8 5 In truth, neither Baker nor
86
Moore rejects the excluder analysis.
Although Baker at one point appears to conflate legal requirements
incorporating ideas that are excluders with legal requirements incorpo87
rating not excluders but what Hart called "defeasible" concepts,
Baker's essay is actually addressed to Hart's views about the latter.8 8
Ideas that function as excluders are not to be equated with Hart's "defeasible" concepts: Hart offered various requirements of liability in contract as an example of the latter. For him, contract was a "defeasible
concept"--one to be analyzed in terms of a discrete set of nonnally necessary and sufficient conditions subject to being "defeated" by a heterogeneous variety of circumstances, such as fraud, duress, lunacy, and
intoxication. Excluders are, on the other hand, not definable in terms of
a set of normally necessary and sufficient conditions. Nor do they name
any positive elements or states. If they name anything, they name whole
dimensions of appraisal, dimensions that may be complex in their own
ways. To paraphrase J. L. Austin, 89 the attempt to capture in a set of
normally necessary and sufficient conditions some characteristic or characteristics common to all things that are or could be called "good faith"
is doomed to failure. Of course, lawyers could reconstruct good faith so
that it would yield to such an analytical approach; but if I am right,
they ought not to do so.
Moreover, a close reading of Baker's admirable essay reveals that
he does not, in the end, reject even Hart's defeasibility analysis as such,
let alone the excluder analysis (which is different) identified and developed by Aristotle, Austin, and others. In truth, Baker very interestingly
proffers an alternative semantic theory that to a significant extent may
save Hart's "defeasibility" analysis.
If Baker had ultimately discredited the excluder analysis for philosophical purposes, it would not follow from this alone that he would have
discredited it for legal purposes. The purposes of law and the purposes
of philosophy are not identical. Even a philosophically-discredited excluder analysis might still provide by analogy a useful approach or
Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 7, at 21 n. 136.
Actually, only the latter is a lawyer-philosopher.
See Baker, Defeasibilipy and Meaning, in LAw, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 26, 43-56 (P.
Hacker and J. Raz eds. 1977); Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 237-38
84
85
86

(1981).
Baker, supra note 86, at 43.
See Hart, The Ascription of Responsibilig and Rights, 49 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 171 (1949).
89 J. L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 70-71 (Warnock ed. 1962).
87

88
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model for the interpretation of case law or the drafting of legal
requirements.9 0
I briefly turn now to the arguments of the lawyer-philosopher, Professor Moore, who is also alleged to have rejected or discredited the excluder analysis. 9 ' It turns out that he, too, does not address the excluder
analysis as such; like Baker, Moore addresses himself instead to Hart's
defeasibility thesis. Thus what I have just suggested about Baker's justly
famous essay applies here as well. Yet a remark of Moore's is certainly
worth quoting for its analogical relevance:
As a normative thesis, defeasibility is on solid ground. Although it is
possible to close the lists of [necessary and sufficient] criteria for "contract," "mens rea," and similar legal terms, they should not be closed
because new cases ought to be decided on grounds of justice rather
92
than by the way they fit in a fixed taxonomy.

C.

The GeneralIndefmabilio of Good Faith

Many commentators suggest that they are willing to accept that
good faith cannot, as such, be usefully defined in terms of a single, general, positive meaning, but most of them still find this state of affairs
rather difficult to live with. At one point or another, in text or in footnote, they try their hand at what seems to be tendered as a general definition. Here are some of the results:
Good faith is an "absence of intention to harm a legally protected
93
pecuniary interest."
- Good faith performance "occurs when a party's discretion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to capture opportunities that were
94
preserved upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively."
Good faith and fair conduct consists of action "according to reasonable standards set by customary practices and by known individ95
ual expectations."
-

My view is that all such efforts to define good faith,forpurposesof a
section like 205, are misguided. Such formulations provide very little, if
any, genuine definitional guidance. Moreover, some of them may restrictively distort the scope of the general requirement of good faith. For
example, the factors relevant in the context may not be confined to what
"custom" and communicated "expectations" dictate. 96 In addition,
90 Incidentally, I have discussed the foregoing issues with Mr. Baker (a fellow of St.
Johns College, Oxford), and he concurs with my analysis.
91 Moore, supra note 86, at 237-42.
92 Id. at 239.
93
94

Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7, at 372-73 n.17.
Id. at 373.

95
96

See text accompanying note 95 supra.

Holmes, supra note 13, at 452.
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such formulations may lead judges and lawyers to ponder and argue
over the meaning of good faith and in this or other ways divert focus
away from the issue of whether a claimed form of bad faith really is, in
light of all relevant circumstantial detail, to be so characterized. Finally, the very idea of good faith, if I am right, is simply not the kind of
idea that is susceptible of such a definitional approach.
All this is not to say that some of the phrases appearing in the foregoing proferred definitions have no relevant utility. As fragments of
statements of rationales for the requirement of good faith, they plainly
do. But to provide a rationale for a requirement is one thing; to define
the ideas that figure in the requirement itself is another.
D.

The Determination of Bad Faith in Novel Cases-The Burton Model

In my earlier effort on good faith, I did not try to set forth a model
decision procedure for the resolution of cases of first impression, and
that was one of the weaknesses of my earlier work. 97 Again, I did say
that "[n]o effort has been made here to identify the criteria which judges
ought to use in deciding whether particular conduct is in bad faith, although enough has been said to show that these criteria must vary from
context to context." 98s And in section II D above, I seek to identify five
general factors that judges should take into account when confronting
novel cases. I also claim in section II D that in many cases, judges can
now turn to one or more of three additional forms of law on good faith
besides section 205 itself.
Professor Burton, in a most interesting essay in the HarvardLaw Review,99 recently proposed a model decision procedure for the resolution
of novel cases posing issues of good-faith performance.'00 The essence of
his model is as follows. One of the two parties will always have what
Professor Burton calls "discretion to perform." At the time of contracting, that party will have given up some of his freedom of action,
which Professor Burton calls "forgone opportunities" (to that party, a
"cost" of contracting). Bad-faith contractual activity is then defined as
"exercising discretion" to recapture one or more of the opportunities forgone upon entering a contract. To determine whether an opportunity
was in fact forgone, it is necessary to inquire into the reasonable expectations of the "dependent party" (the other party). The party with discretion to perform acts in good faith if he does not attempt to recapture
a forgone opportunity. Professor Burton also argues that "whether a
particular discretion-exercising party acted to recapture forgone oppor97
I did, however, set forth a recommended approach for lawyers to follow when interpreting past cases on good faith. See also note 28 supra.
98 Summers, Good Faith,supra note 5, at 206.
99 Burton, Breach ofContract, supra note 7, at 378-94.
100

See also Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 7.
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tunities is a question of subjective intent"-a "subjective inquiry."
Moreover, the "objective inquiry" into the dependent party's reasonable
expectations is not alone "dispositive." Indeed, Professor Burton stresses
that instead the inquiry into state of mind is "of central importance."101
We may adopt one of Professor Burton's illustrations10 2 to try to
demonstrate his model at work. Assume that L and T entered into a
lease providing that T was to pay rentals as a percentage of the gross
receipts of T's business on the premises. T also had another store in the
same town. From time to time, he diverted customers to that other store
(where he owned the premises), thereby reducing the rentals otherwise
payable to L. For this, L sued T, claiming that T's diversionary tactics
were in bad faith. Here, according to Professor Burton, a court should
presumably find (1) that a reasonable person in L's position expected to
receive rentals not depleted by T's diversionary acts, and (2) that T
acted with the subjective intention of recapturing a forgone
opportunity.
Professor Burton, unlike many who have criticized general requirements of good faith, does believe in them and has sought to direct his
efforts largely to making them more effective. Moreover, he does not
ultimately seek to resolve issues of good faith under a general requirement like section 205 through a general definition of some presumed
positive content of that phrase. He also concedes that what a general
good-faith requirement rules out varies to some extent depending on the
context. And he generally seeks to focus on the reasons for ruling out
claimed forms of bad faith. In all these respects, despite some misleading protestations to the contrary, his approach is itself generally consistent with the spirit of section 205, including its excluder
conceptualization.
Professor Burton makes a number of claims on behalf of his approach, as opposed to what he calls the "traditional" approach (born
not so long ago in the history of the common law and including, presumably, that of section 205). First, he says that his approach provides
more analytical focus. It isolates "with greater particularity the factors
that must be considered in determining good or bad-faith performance." 10 3 Instead of an "amorphous totality of factual circumstances,"
we have an inquiry into reasonable expectations of the "dependent
party" and the subjective intent of the "discretion-exercising" party-all
to determine precisely whether the discretion-exercising party has acted
to recapture forgone opportunities so as to constitute bad faith. Is this
analysis necessarily any more focused than that of section 205 in a novel
good-faith performance case? Does it focus on the right things? Does it
101
102
103

Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7, at 384.
See id. at 384-85.
Id. at 391.
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go far enough? These are large questions, and I cannot now do full
justice to them. I have already tried to show in this Article that section
205 provides judges with considerable guidance, not merely in novel
performance cases but in performance and enforcement cases generally.
It is true that Professor Burton's model introduces new terminology and
appears to reduce to two questions; but I do not see that anything turns
on this. Why, for example, should it "advance the analysis" to inquire
whether the discretion-exercising party is seeking to "recapture forgone
opportunities," rather than whether his actions fall outside the reasonable expectations of the dependent party in light of the various factors
in the circumstances that legitimately shape those expectations? Or why
does it help (if it does) in our foregoing lease illustration to inquire
whether the tenant, in diverting customers, was trying to recapture costs
incurred in entering the contract, rather than whether what the tenant
did was, all things considered, contrary to the spirit of the deal?
One may also question whether the Burton model really focuses on
the right things. For example, does the subjective inquiry into the discretion-exercising party's state of mind really have the central importance that is claimed? 0 4 Part of the claim, as I understand it, is that
this inquiry is oypical'y relevant, not just contingently so. This does not
accord with section 205.105 Moreover, in a great many well-decided per10 6
formance cases, courts give little or no consideration to this factor.
Indeed, its independent significance in the Burton model is at least in
some areas problematic. Consider, again, the lease illustration. If the
court decides that the reasonable expectations of the landlord rule out
the tenant's acts of diverting customers to his other store, what if anything would it add to inquire into the tenant's state of mind? It is said
(a) that the "traditional analysis" focuses mainly on benefits due the
promisee under the agreement and (b) that this is inadequate because
the promisor may be "entitled" to withhold something in good faith. 107
Whether or not (a) is true, (b) does not follow. If what is due the promisee really does exclude what the promisor wants to withhold, then that
will be dispositive. What one is "entitled" to withhold depends on what
is due the promisee. (This is not to say that an inquiry into the promisor's state of mind can never have independent significance in goodfaith performance cases.)
Further, in my view the Burton model does not go far enough.
104
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See id. at 395.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comment d (1979).
Se generaly Summers, GoodFaith,supra note 5, at 232-43 (citing cases). The main case
that Professor Burton cites on the subjective inquiry is a case in which the contract embodied
a clause requiring that the promisee be satisfied with performance. Burton, Breach of Contract,
supra note 7, at 390 (citing Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457
(1912).
107
See generaly Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7, at 387-92.
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That is, it does not provide as much focus as section 205 of the Restatement Second and the general case law now permit. I suspect that it is now
possible to develop useful lists of factors generally relevant to the determination of good-faith performance in a number of different performance contexts. Professor Burton seems content, for example, to leave the
general test of reasonableness of expectations relatively unanalyzed. Yet
Professors Hillman' 0 8 and Holmes10 9 have shown, in comparable goodfaith contexts, that a closer analysis and differentiation of relevant factors is possible. Nothing in the excluder conceptualization embodied in
section 205 is inconsistent with the articulation of such criteria. A general requirement of good faith can rule out forms of bad faith identifiable by reference to these criteria."10 Indeed, as I have already
suggested, some such criteria in some contexts may now be ripe for formulation in rules.
Professor Burton claims that, in addition to more focus, his model
provides more generality than other approaches and thus is more "lawlike." In particular, he thinks it is less a "license" for the exercise of ad
hoc judicial intuition." 1 Again, I fail to see why there is any less generality in the Restatement Second approach. Certainly each "context" to
which Professor Braucher referred in the Comments consists of more
than "the discrete case."' 12 Indeed, he adopted a number ofgeneral categories for the classification of general types of bad faith--categories
well populated with actual decisions.' 13 Moreover, there is no reason
why the legal generalities emergent in these contexts cannot take account of factors that vary with the stage in the contracting process at
114
which the issue of good faith arises.
Finally, Professor Burton claims that his model provides a useful
new "perspective and policy framework" within which good-faith performance issues are more manageable.1 5 Close analysis suggests, however, that it is less general than Professor Burton makes it seem, and that
it introduces economic ideas and terminology that may breed uncertainty or confusion. I will say something further only about the first of
108

See the articles by Professor Hillman in note 54 supra.
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See Holmes, supra note 13.

110 Profesor Burton has suggested that I once believed the contrary. Thus, he suggests
that in my earlier article I purported to offer the excluder analysis "instead" of criteria of
decision. Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7, at 369-70 n.5. He states that I "was led
effectively to deny that any general principle or principles could be articulated as criteria for
judicial decision." Burton, Article 2 Good Faith,supra note 7, at 21 n.136. I plead not guilty to
both charges.
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Burton, Article 2 GoodFaith, supra note 7, at 21 n.136; Burton, Breach of Contract, supra

note 7, at 369-70.
112 This attribution appears at Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 7, at 21 n.136.
113 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, Comment d (1979); Summers,
Good Faith, supra note 5, at 232-43.
114 See Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note 7, at 21 n.136.
115 Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7, at 370-71 & n.8.
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these observations. The model is less general because it is in truth
drawn mainly from those cases in which contracting parties have in fact
conferred on one of the parties some genuine discretionary power in
matters of performance. Many good-faith performance cases are not of
this kind; they do not confer discretion to perform in some way. 116 It is
not difficult to discern the likely motive here behind the Burton model.
The maneuver of adopting a conceptual framework in which one party
is always considered to have discretion felicitously generates thepossibilito that the "discretion-exercising" party might have failed to perform in
good faith, and thus seems to give pervasive point to the "subjective
inquiry" of such central importance in the model. After all, "a party
with discretion may withhold all benefits for good reasons.", 17 In many
cases posing issues of good-faith performance, however, there will be no
such discretion and therefore no such possibility. And even when this is
not so, the subjective inquiry may lack independent significance.
E.

Good Faith and Moraism

One commentator recently expressed strong concern that courts
may very likely overextend a general requirement of good faith of the
kind embodied in section 205, the Comments, and the Reporter's Note,
all in the name of altruism, Good Samaritanism, general benevolence,
moral idealism, or the like.1 18 The shortest answer to this concern is that
the extensive case law to date does not reveal any significant tendency of
this kind.1 19 But a bit more should be said on this point.
The risk of overextension is inherent in any doctrine.' 20 Experience
to date indicates that the risk is not great with regard to section 205.
This is hardly surprising. Our contract law has been relatively free of
moralism, especially any forms legitimately describable as "Good
Samaritanism" or the like. Moreover, legal good faith is not identical
with moral good faith.12 ' In any event, a requirement of good faith is a
minimal standard rather than a high ideal. In addition, section 205, the
Comment, and the Reporter's Note incorporate safeguards. And the determinations of trial judges and jurors are subject to various forms of
review.
116
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See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5,at 232-43.
Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 7,at 384.
Gillette, Limitations on the Obligaiton of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619.
Indeed, Professor Gillette ishard pressed to find any cases that look at alllike the

beginnings of a parade of horribles.
120 Professor Gillette writes of the "broad discretion implied by Summers's analysis," id.
at 646, including, presumably, "good samaritanism" (his phrase). Id. at 645. I can only report
that I have recently re-read my article in search of support for this view, without success. And
Summers, GoodFaith,
I am glad to say that one can find much in it to the contrary. See,e.g.,
supra note 5, at 265-66. See also id.at 198, 200, 204, 205, 206, 220, 232, 233, 243, 248, 261, 263,
264.
121 See id. at 204 n.46.
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The ultimate question is whether the gain is worth the risk. I cannot say that all the cases so far soundly decided in major part on the
basis of a general obligation of good faith would certainly have been
decided the other way in the absence of such an obligation; yet certainly
some of them would have. And it is also certain that some private parties acting out of court would have acted differently in interpreting contracts and settling contract disputes in the absence of such an obligation.
Finally, it must be conceded that in the days before such an obligation
was generally recognized, some judges sometimes used indirect and covert tools to remedy bad faith; yet this involved costs, too.
CONCLUSION

The final adoption and publication of section 205 is fairly certain to
accelerate the growth of general contract law on good faith. At least
two major tasks remain here for contract scholars. They will have a
continuing responsibility to try to evaluate, systematize, and when the
time comes, refine, this case law into more discrete categories and forms
of law. They will also have the interesting task, as the case law grows, of
identifying its implications for numerous other general doctrines of contract law. The discovery and recognition of these implications is almost
certain to be a rich source of insight into the deeper mysteries of the
social institution of contract.
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APPENDIX
§ 205. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.

Comment:
a. Meanings of "oodfaith. " Good faith is defined in Uniform Com-

mercial Code § 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." "In the case of a merchant" Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-103(1) (b) provides that good faith means "honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commerical standards of fair dealing in the
trade." The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they violate community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness. The appropriate remedy for a breach of the
duty of good faith also varies with the circumstances.
b. Goodfaith purchase. In many situations a good faith purchaser of
property for value can acquire better rights in the property than his
transferor had. See, e.g., § 342. In this context "good faith" focuses on
the honesty of the purchaser, as distinguished from his care or negligence. Particularly in the law of negotiable instruments inquiry may be
limited to "good faith" under what has been called "the rule of the pure
heart and the empty head." When diligence or inquiry is a condition of
the purchaser's right, it is said that good faith is not enough. This focus
on honesty is appropriate to cases of good faith purchase; it is less so in
cases of good faith performance.
c. Goodfaith in negotiation. This Section, like Uniform Commercial

Code § 1-203, does not deal with good faith in the formation of a contract. Bad faith in negotiation, although not within the scope of this
Section, may be subject to sanctions. Particular forms of bad faith in
bargaining are the subjects of rules as to capacity to contract, mutual
assent and consideration and of rules as to invalidating causes such as
fraud and duress. See, for example, §§ 90 and 208. Moreover, remedies
for bad faith in the absence of agreement are found in the law of torts or
restitution. For examples of a statutory duty to bargain in good faith,
see, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 8(d) and the federal Truth in
Lending Act. In cases of negotiation for modification of an existing contractual relationship, the rule stated in this Section may overlap with
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more specific rules requiring negotiation in good faith. See §§ 73, 89;
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-209 and Comment.
d Goodfaith perfomnance. Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes his
conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may
be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more
than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible,
but the following types are among those which have been recognized in
judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence
and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a
power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in
the other party's performance.
Illustrations:
1. A, an oil dealer, borrows $100,000 from B, a supplier, and agrees to
buy all his requirements of certain oil products from B on stated terms
until the debt is repaid. Before the debt is repaid, A makes a new
arrangement with C, a competitor of B. Under the new arrangement
A's business is conducted by a corporation formed and owned by A
and C and managed by A, and the corporation buys all its oil products from C. The new arrangement may be found to be subterfuge or
evasion and a breach of contract by A.
2. A, owner of a shopping center, leases part of it to B, giving B the
exclusive right to conduct a supermarket, the rent to be a percentage
of B's gross receipts. During the term of the lease A acquires adjoining land, expands the shopping center, and leases part of the adjoining land to C for a competing supermarket. Unless such action was
contemplated or is otherwise justified, there is a breach of contract by
A.
3. A Insurance Company insures B against legal liability for certain
bodily injuries to third persons, with a limit of liability of $10,000 for
an accident to any one person. The policy provides that A will defend
any suit covered by it but may settle. C sues B on a claim covered by
the policy and offers to settle for $9,500. A refuses to settle on the
ground that the amount is excessive, and judgment is rendered
against B for $20,000 after a trial defended by A. A then refuses to
appeal, and offers to pay $10,000 only if B satisifes the judgment, impairing B's opportunity to negotiate for settlement. B prosecutes an
appeal, reasonably expending $7,500, and obtains dismissal of the
claim. A has failed to deal fairly and in good faith with B and is liable
for B's appeal expense.
4. A and B contract that A will perform certain demolition work for
B and pay B a specified sum for materials salvaged, the contract not
to "become effective until" certain insurance policies "are in full force
and effect." A makes a good faith effort to obtain the insurance, but
financial difficulty arising from injury to an employee of A on another
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job prevents A from obtaining them. A's duty to perform is
discharged.
5. B submits and A accepts a bid to supply approximately 4000 tons
of trap rock for an airport at a unit price. The parties execute a standard form of "Invitation, Bid, and Acceptance (Short Form Contract)" supplied by A, including typed terms "to be delivered to
project as required," "delivery to start immediately," "cancellation by
A may be effected at any time." Good faith requires that A order and
accept the rock within a reasonable time unless A has given B notice
of intent to cancel.
6. A contracts to perform services for B for such compensation "as
you, in your sole judgment, may decide is reasonable." After A has
performed the services, B refuses to make any determination of the
value of the services. A is entitled to their value as determined by a
court.
7. A suffers a loss of property covered by an insurance policy issued
by B, and submits to B notice and proof of loss. The notice and proof
fail to comply with requirements of the policy as to form and detail. B
does not point out the defects, but remains silent and evasive, telling
A broadly to perfect his claim. The defects do not bar recovery on the
policy.
e. Goodfaith in enforcement. The obligation of good faith and fair
dealing extends to the assertion, settlement and litigation of contract
claims and defenses. See, e.g., §§ 73, 89. The obligation is violated by
dishonest conduct such as conjuring up a pretended dispute, asserting
an interpretation contrary to one's own understanding, or falsification of
facts. It also extends to dealing which is candid but unfair, such as taking advantage of necessitous circumstances of the other party to extort a
modification of a contract for the sale of goods without legitimate commercial reason. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-209, Comment 2.
Other types of violation have been recognized in judicial decisions:
harassing demands for assurances of performance, rejection of performance for unstated reasons, willful failure to mitigate damages, and abuse
of a power to determine compliance or to terminate the contract. For a
statutory duty of good faith in termination, see the federal Automobile
Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1976).
Illustrations:
8. A contracts to sell and ship goods to B on credit. The contract
provides that, if B's credit or financial responsibility becomes impaired or unsatisfactory to A, A may demand cash or security before
making shipment and may cancel if the demand is not met. A may
properly demand cash or security only if he honestly believes, with
reason, that the prospect of payment is impaired.
9. A contracts to sell and ship goods to B. On arrival B rejects the
goods on the erroneous ground that delivery was late. B is thereafter
precluded from asserting other unstated grounds then known to him
which A could have cured if stated seasonably.
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REPORTER'S NOTE
This Section is new. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and
Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30
U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968); 3A Corbin, Contracts §§ 654A-I (Supp. 1980).
As to the development of "good faith" in German law, see Dawson, The
Oracles of the Law 461-502 (1968).
For an important discussion of the concept, see Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), applying it to an employment contract terminable at will. In VTR, Inc. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), it was
held that particular conduct that would have been barred by the duty
of good faith could be expressly consented to in the contract. Some of
the limits of the duty are discussed in Sessions, Inc. v. Morton, 491 F.2d
854 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Commercial Contractors, Inc. v. United
States F. & G. Co., 524 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing good faith,
custom of trade and a general contractor's lack of duty to help a subcontractor keep his work force intact when another subcontractor offers
higher wages).
Comment b. See Gilmore, The Commerical Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 Yale L. J. 1057 (1954).
Comment c. See Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining
in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1964); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 1401 (1958); Summers, Collective Agreements and the
Law of Contracts, 78 Yale L. J. 525 (1969).
Comment d Illustration 1 is based on Western Oil & Fuel Co. v.
Kemp, 245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957); cf. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper
Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1942); Uniform Commercial Code § 2-306(1). Illustration 2 is based on Daitch
Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. Neisloss, 8 A.D.2d 965, 190 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1959),
affid mem., 8 N.Y.2d 723, 201 N.Y.S.2d 101, 167 N.E.2d 643 (1960);
Carter v. Adler, 138 Cal. App.2d 63, 291 P.2d 111 (1955); see Annots.,
170 A.L.R. 1113 (1947), 38 A.L.R.2d 1113 (1954); cf. Food Fair Stores,
Inc. v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 200 A.2d 166 (1964) (good faith of
lessee); Uniform Commercial Code § 2-306(2) (obligation to use best efforts in cases of exclusive dealing in goods); Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussion of scope of "best efforts");
Riess v. Murchison, 503 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
993 (1975) (buyers of land required by implied obligation of good faith
to produce, save and sell water on which sellers' adjoining lands were
dependant); Center Garment Co. v. United Refrig. Co., 369 Mass. 633,
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341 N.E.2d 669 (1976) (franchisor required to make at least some effort
to find supplies for franchisee when previous source was cut off). Compare Sessions, Inc. v. Morton, 491 F.2d 854 (9th cir. 1974) (no implied
obligation on lessors to agree to dedicate significant portion of land to
public use even though dedication might be necessary to permit lessee to
develop land). Illustration 3 is based on Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914); see Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 690 (1960);
cf. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955) (insurer's duty to settle); Keeton,
Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 134 Vand.
L. Rev. 837 (1960); Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 66 Cal. App. 3d 951,
136 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1977), discussed below in connection with Comment
e. Illustration 4 is based on Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Employers' Fire
Ins. Co., 327 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1964). Illustration 5 is based on Sylvan
Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945);
cf. Uniform Comercial Code § 2-309(3). Illustration 6 is based on Pillois
v. Billingsley, 179 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1950); see also In re Estate of Hollingsworth, 88 Wash.2d 322, 560 P.2d 348 (1977); cf. California Lettuce
Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal.2d 474, 484, 289 P.2d 785,
791 (1955) (power to fix price of goods); Uniform Commercial Code § 2-305(2) (same). Illustration 7 is based on Johnson v. Scottish Union Ins.
Co., 160 Tenn. 152, 22 S.W.2d 362 (1962); cf. Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-311 (cooperation in sale of goods).
Comment e. See Kessler & Brenner, Automobile Dealer Franchises:
Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 Yale L.J. 1135 (1957). Several
courts have found that an express power to terminate a contract at will
was modified by a duty of good faith. See, e.g., Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (salesman's
employment contract); Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 66 Cal. App.3d
951, 136 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1977); 26 Drake L. Rev. 883 (1976-77) (termination of physician's malpractice insurance allegedly as part of scheme
to intimidate the profession to accept higher premiums; court analogized from the insurer's duty to settle claims in good faith, see Illustration 3, supra); L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th
Cir. 1968) (termination of dentist's malpractice insurance as retaliation
because he testified against other dentist insured by same carrier); Shell
Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 920 (1974) (termination of service station franchise; court reasoned
both from dominant position of franchisor and from Legislature's enactment of franchising statute not applicable to particular transaction). Illustration 8 is based on James B. Berry's Sons Co. v. Monark Gasoline &
Oil Co., 32 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1929); cf. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 1208, 2-609. Illustration 9 is based on Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va.
123, 126 S.E. 231 (1925); cf. § 248; Uniform Commerical Code § 2605(1)(a).

